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AMBIGUITY, ABSURDITY, AND
REVERSIBILITY: INDETERMINACY
IN DE BEAUVOIR, CAMUS,
AND MERLEAU-PONTY
Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty are only three of the numerous French philosophers who have
expressed an intellectual debt to the work of Edmund Husserl.
Despite the different concerns and approaches each of these three
exhibit in their respective works, there is a rather striking similarity
in that aspect of Husserl's thought which they choose to focus on
and develop in their own unique ways. This aspect is Husserl's
emphasis on the indeterminacy or obscurity that is an inherent
eomponent of each of our intentional aets.
Husserlian Indeterminacy
The notion of indeterminacy is repeatedly evoked in
Husserl's thought, yet he never explores its ramifications for his
own phenomenological project in sufficient depth. Perhaps this is
due, above all, to the challenge that an emphasis on indeterminacy
poses for Husserl's eidetic reduction. The challenge involves the
suceessful negotiation of a double-bind: to discuss the phenomena
in their givenness as phenomena requires a corresponding
diseussion of the indeterminate ways in which they are given, and
yet, it is this very indeterminacy that seems to threaten an
understanding of the essential manner and mode in which they
appear. In Husserl's own work, he frequently circumvents this
double-bind by pursuing the former approach at the expense of the
latter, namely, by systematically discussing the various ways in
which intentional objects are presented to consciousness through
a "zone of indeterminacy." This zone of indeterminacy beeomes
very closely identified with the horizonal nature of our everyday
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experiences as in the following passage from The Crisis 0'Europesn
Sciences Bnd Trsnscendents/ Phenomen%gy when Husserl asserts
that:
the partieuler objeet of our active con8ciouanea8, end
eorrelativelv the active, eon.cioua having of It, belng directed
toward It, and deeling with it- all thi. i. forever .urrounded by an
atmo.phere of mute, concealect, but eofunctioning validitie., a
vtt.. horlzon into whieh the aetive ego cen alao direct itself
voluntarily, reactivating old acquiaitiona, conacioualy graaping
new epperceptive ideaa, tran.forming them into intuitiona.
Secauae of thi. con.tantly flowing horIzon" charact.r, then,
every straightforwardlv ·performed validity in natural world-life
alwava preauppo.e. validitie. extending back, immediately or
mediatelv, into 8 nece.aary aub.oil of obscure but ocee.ionaUy
aveilable reactivatable veliditiea, eil of whieh together, ineluding
the pre.ent acts, meke up a single indivi.ible, interrelated
eomplex of life.1
What are these "obscure validities" that cannot be separated from
the "single indivisible, interrelated complex of Iife7" To call them
validities and to emphasize their inextricability in relation to our
everyday experiences indicates quite strongly the fundamental role
that these indeterminate aspects of existence play in each and every
one of our reflective (and pre-reflective) acts. Moreover, their
indeterminacy which, as Husserl teils us, can only "occasionally" be
made available to our intentional consciousness, seems to be
primarily a function of their character as possibilities, possibilities
not yet or previously chosen, which nonetheless influence the
meaning that is given to the present experience. Thus, this
indeterminacy can be viewed, to a large extent, as arising out of the
temporality of human existence; a temporality characterized by a
present which is articulated out of the horizons of the past and the
future, temporal dimensions that are by their very nature in flux, and
therefore, indeterminate.
And yeti to understand the indeterminacy that underlies our
experiences merely as a function of temporality would be an
oversimplification of Husserl's own, complex understanding of the
horizonal nature of those experiences. For it is important to
I P. 149.
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remember that there are two horizons that Husserl asks us to take
into aeeount when we want to understand what it means to
pereeive a thing, the -internal- horizon and the -external- horizon,
both of whieh have their own signifieance, their own possibilities,
and their own indeterminaey.2
Husserl distinguishes the internaI and the external horizon
and the role that they play in our perceptlon of things as folIows:
For conscioulnel. the individuel thing i. not elone: the perception
of • thing i. perception of it within • p.rceptual fleld. And just
8S the individual thing in perception h.1 me.ning only throug~ .n
open horizon of "poI.ible perceptionl," inlof.r .1 wh.t is
8ctually perceived "points" to a eyatematic multiplicity of eil
possible perceptuel exhibitings b.longing to it harmonioully, 10
the thing ha. yet another horizon: be.idel thil "internal horizon"
it h8S an "externel horizon" preeis.ly •• a thing within • fielet of
thinge: .nd thi. pointl tinally to the whole "world .1 pereeptuel
world.,,3
The internal horizon, then, refers to the multiplicity of possible
pereeptions I can have of a given thing, and these pereeptions as
weil as this thing are located within a pereeptual field that ineludes
other things and the possible pereeptions I may have of them. This
external horizon in turn points toward the world whieh serves as the
continuous horizon for all of my aetual and possible experiences.
Indeterminaey appears in and through all three of these horizons
and, to the extent that any one thing or aspect of a thing is
rendered determinate, other things, their aspeets, and the
perceptual field itself will neeessarily remain indeterminate.
Despite the presenee of indeterminacy as a faetor to be
reekoned with in all of my experiences on several different levels,
in Idess Husserl is optimistic about the potential for making more
2 Ultimatcly there Are tbreo lUch horizona: the internal horizon that i. tied to the pouible
perceptiona available throu.h any ODe thilll; the external horizon tbat conailtl of the perceptual
field in which that tbina i••ituated; and ehe world horizon which in tum .ituate. the perceptual
field.
3 7Jae Crlsis 01European Sdmce" p. 162.
73
and more aspeets of experienee determinate.
aeknowledges on the one hand that:
While he
en experience thet he. become the object of e personeUv directed
glence, end so hes the modus of the .",.t.1y looked et, he.
its own fringe of experiences thet ere not d.liberetely viewed ...
e fringe of beckground inettention .howing reletivedifference. of
cleerness end ob.curity, e. welle. of emphe.is end leck of relief
he also sees this as a souree of eidetie possibilities. that are
aetualized by bringing:
what is not th. object of e personelly directed look within the
focu. of pure mental vi.ion, rai.ing the unemphetic into relief,
and meking the ob.cu,e 'clear end .ve, cleere,.4
What is espeeially signifieant about these passages, is that
they make elear Husserl's methodologieal eommitment, namely, to
render the indeterminate aspeets of experienee as determinate as
possible. This projeet is a familiar one that Husserl has himself
inherited from the eartesian tradition. The transition from Deseartes
to Husserl in the eonceptualization of this project ineludes Husserl's
recognition that, in order to make some aspects of experience
determinate, other aspeets of experienee will, as a direet
eonsequenee of this determinacy, remain inde~erminate. 5
Moreover, Husserl views this indeterminacy positively precisely
insofar as it is against these indeterminate horizons that objeets can
be brought into relief. And yet, Husserl holds out the hope that we
can (perhaps at some future time) concern ourselves with these
indeterminate aspects of experience, making them determinate
through the deliberate foeus of our attention., whieh in turn suggests
that the indeterminaey is primarily a funetion of attention (that is,
results from the very nature of intentional eonseiousness) rather
than an essential aspeet of the phenomena themselves.
.. P. 220.
, In aleDIe, DelCarte. allO actnowled,e. thi. in the Dlscoune Oft Methotl, however, he
places the primary blame for thi. indetenninacy on memory which i. limited in itl ability 10
teep a lalJe number of ideal clearly and diltincdy before aur view.
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What is so distinctive about the ways in which Camus, de
Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty invoke and develop Husserl's notion of
indeterminacy in their own work is their transformation of
indeterminacy from being more of a consequence of intentionality
to a fundamental feature of human existence, one which extends
beyond our intentional awareness of our situation, characterizing the
situation as such. For de Beauvoir, indeterminaey is explored
through the notion of ambiguity: an irreducible ambiguity that
eharacterizes human existenee and whieh demands a response
through eonerete human actions, actions that can in no way dispel
or diminish the ambiguity, but which allow us to live this ambiguity
in meaningful ways. Camus interprets indeterminaey as existential
absurdity; an absurdity which threatens the attempt to give meaning
to one's life and which therefore makes suicide the "one truly
serious philosophieal problem. ,,8 Finally, Merleau-Ponty
investigates the corporelll significance of indeterminacy through the
phenomenon of reversibility: a phenomenon that is revealed
through the constant, mutual interaction between the flesh that is
my body and the flesh that is the world.
Indeterminacy 81 Ambiguity
"From the very beginning, " de Beauvoir teils us in The Ethics
of Ambiguity, "existentialism defined itself as a .philosophy of
ambiguity. ,,7 This ambiguity she traces back to Kierkegaard and
his opposition to Hegelian dialectic which ultimately surpasses
ambiguity through the Aufhebung reeonciling thesis and antithesis.
Ind8ed, de Beauvoir suggests, without ambiguity, without "failure"
there can be no ethies. Instead of focusing on the ethical
ramifieations of ambiguity which de Beauvoir explores in this text,
let us address the following two questions: What does this
ambiguity eonsist in precisely, and why can it be understood as a
type of failure7
Elaborating on the Sartrean claim that "man is a useless
passion," de Beauvoir teils us ·that:
6 7Jae Myda 0/Sisyphus and OIher Essays, p. 3.
7 P. 9.
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man, in hil vain attempt to be God, makel hirnself exist .. man,
and if he is satisfied with thil existence, he coincides exactly
with hirnself• It I. not granted Nm to exlst wlthout tending
toward thi. being which he will never be. But it i. po••ible for
him to want thi. ten.ion even with the failure which it involves.
His being is lack of being, but this leck haI a way of being which
is precisely exi.tence.8
Thus, the ambiguity of existenee refers to a tension that arises
through our making ourselves what we are (existing beings whose
existenee is defined as Isck) by trying to be what we are not (God
or absolute eoineidenee of in-itself and for-itself). Insofar as what
we are cannot be reconeiled with what we are not, the tension is
maintained, and it is the ongoing negotiation of this very tension
that resists negotation that de Beauvoir identifies with the failed
projeet of human existenee. The tension involves failure beeause
it allows us to eoineide with what we are preeisely when we fail to
eoineide with what we are not and what we are is a lack that defies
eoineidenee. And, it is this failure that reveals the essential
ambiguity of human existence, namely, the eo-existenee of two
different ways of inhabiting our situation whieh must be
simultaneously lived through without either of them ever being
attained or reconciled with one another.
This fundamental, ontological ambiguity that is tied to the
Sartrean duality and incompossibility of for-itself and in-itself is not
the primary ambiguity that de Beauvoir is eoncerned with in this
text, however. Instead, it provides the basis tor her eall tor an
"existentialist" acknowledges rather than avoids the ambiguity of
our existence, and actively seeks to realize this ambiguity in our
everyday lives. Realizing this ambiguity involves refusing to posit
one's ends as absolutes, that is, retusing to believe in
"unconditioned values." And, it is by recognizing the relativity of
the ends that we nonetheless attempt to arrive at absolutely in our
actions, that we confront another type of ambiguity, namely, the
ethical ambiguity that arises when we are faced with the perpetual
dilemma of having to perform actions that require absolute
commitments without ever being able to attain absolute
justifications for them. Finally, it is because there are no
• 1Jte Ethlcs 0/Amblgulty, pp. 12-13.
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unconditioned values that we can be forced to choose between two
mutually incompatible but mutually compelling alternatives, and this
gives rise to ethical ambiguity in the fullest sense of the word, an
ambiguity that must be decisively reckoned with, but which cannot
ever be satisfactorily resolved one way or the other.9
Interestingly enough, Oe Beauvoir compares this
existentialist conversion, this recognition and embracing of the
ambiguity of existence, to a Husserlian reduction whereby or:ae
"brackets· one's ·will to be" in order to be made conscious of one's
"true condition.• 10 For, she asserts:
just as phenomenologieel reduction prevents the errors of
dogmatism by sU8pending eil affirmation eoneerning the mode of
reality-of the externel wortd, whose fleeh and bone presenee the
reduetion doe. not, however, contest, so existentialist eonversion
does not .uppress my instincts, desires, plans, and pa.sions. It
merely prevents any possibility of fsilure by refusing to set up .s
absolutes the ends towards whieh my tran.eendenee thrusts
itself, and by eonsidering them in their eonneetion with the
freedom whieh projeets them. 11
The "true condition, " which the Husserlian reduction allows us to be
made conscious of, involves consciousness of the interdependency
of noesis and noema, of the intentional Ict which identifies a given
phenomenon as such, and of the intentional object which orients
and gives meaning to the intentional Ict. To recognize the
fundamental connection between noesis and noema is also to deny
9 A famou. example of lUch I dilemma come. from Bel,., and Nolhi,.,ne66 when Sirtre
dilCu'se. tbe need for I yoo. man 10 decide whether 10 fl,ht for hit country or 10 ltay home
and ca~ for hit firm and hit flmi1y. A deci.ion mult be made, Ind it require. choo'ina ODe
of the two alternative.. The aituation i. ambiauou, becauae both coorae. of Iction cu be
ethicilly defended, and yet 1hey are incompatible. ODe and only ODe of 1he alternativo. musl
be cholCn and thil requirel fulfiUm,IOOIC relpOuibilitiel at tbe expcDIe of othen. The ethical
chaUenae, Sartre dcclarel, i. not for the youna man (or for UI) 10 proclaim that one alternative
i. ri,ht aod ODe i. wrong, hut to decide, IndiMdually, which courae ofaction i. ri,ht for oneaclf,
at that time, in that .ituation. And, once ~ecidcd upon, Sartre lUlle.., ooc'. commitment
should be 10 that choice, evell wlaik ODe acmowled,e. the validity of the option not cholCn.
10 17te ElJdC6 0/babiguity, p. 15.
11 17te Elhics 0/Ambi,uity, p. 14.
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the existence of absolutes; it is to deny the presence of meanings
independent of consciousness and consciousness independent of
meaning. Moreover, de Beauvoir's association of the existentialist
conversion with Husserl's phen9menological reduction also points
towards the close link between the indeterminacy that is revealed
in and through the reduction and the ambiguity that 'characterizes
human existence.
Indetermlnaey al Ablurdity
In his essay, -An Absurd Reasoning, - Camus credits Husserl
with opening -to intuition and to the heart a whole proliferation of
phenomena, the wealth of which has about it something
inhuman.- 12 It is striking that Camus associates the richness of
the ph~nomenaHusserl opens up for phenomenological investigation
with -something inhuman, W because, for Husserl, insofar as the
phenomena are capable of being grasped as such, they are tied
inextricably to human (intentional) activity. And yet, what Camus
is appealing to with this notion of the winhumanwis that which is
foreign to human affairs and, more importantly, human
comprehension. Indeed, Camus identifies Husserl 'as one of those
Wmen who vie with one another in proclaiming that nothing is clear,
all is chaos, that 'all man has is his lucidity and his' definite
knowledge of the walls surrounding him. w13 I am not sure that
Husserl would have been comfortable with this evaluation of his
project, however, what Camus is suggesting here is that a primary
contribution Husserl has made to the phenomenological and
existentialist traditions, has been to open up a range of phenomena
for investigation that are, on principle, incapable of being articulated
fully. Moreover, Camus suggests in this passage that the inability
to arrive at a comprehensive description of these phenomena that
together constitute the life-world, is due to the very nature of the
things themselves which resist human wluciditY. W
Although I would argue that Husserl does not posit such a
poignant conflict between the phenomena and the human lucidity
12 71ae "'ylla 0/Slsypluu and OIIter Euays, p. 20.
13 71ae "'ylla 0/Slsypluu and OIIter Essays, pp. 20-21.
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which tries to grasp their essences, the grounds for such a reading
of Husserl are established in part through Husserl's emphasis on the
"experience-fringe,· or the indeterminate features of each
experience which are not deliberately focused on and whose
presence leads Husserl to formulate "the eidetically valid and self-
evident proposition, that no concrete experience can pass 81
independent in the tull .en.e of the term. WHusserl's awareness of
the wwallsw surrounding our attempts to subject our experiences to
human lucidity can also be found in his subsequent claim that each
concrete experience ·'stands in need of completion' in respect of
some connected whole, which in form and in kind ia not something
we are free to choose, but are rather bound to accept. w14
Camus interprets our being compelled to accept aspects of
the situation which we have not chosen as revealing the irrationality
(incomprehensibility) of our situation. He claims that each of us has
a "Ionging for happiness and for reasonwwhich can be understood
as a longing to break down the barriers that bar the ·way to human
lucidity, thereby attaining the happiness that comes from
conquering this walienw or irrational territory and expanding the
domain of reason. This kind of happiness, ~owever, can never be
attained; indeed, Wthe absurd is born of this confrontation between
the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world." Rather
than trying to negate or avoid this absurdity by either denying the
need or refusing to confront it with what cannot be understood,
Camus asserts that absurdity "must be clung to because the whole
consequence of a life can depend on it. w15 .
This longing for happiness attained through reason and the
impossibility of satisfying it is most poignantly reflected in Camus'
own myth of Sisyphus. In his retelling of this Greek myth, Camus
presents the compatibility of the longing, the recognition of its
absurdity which arises out of the irrationality of the situation, and
the possibility of a new kind of happiness when he calls Sisyphus
the "absurd hero" whom we must imagine happy. Sisyphus'
"defiantW happiness is happiness in the face of the longing,
14 ldetu, p. 221.
15 11Ie Myth 01Sisypluu and Other Essays, p. 21.
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happiness whieh refuses to give up the human need .out of whieh
this longing is born. For Camus, it is the reeognition and embracing
of this need and the simultaneous acknowledgement of the
impossibility of satisfying it whieh is the truly ~ffirmative let.
Ind.termin.ey .1 ReveraibUlty
In his commemorative essay to Husserl, ·The Philosopher
and His Shadow,· Merleau-Ponty sets himself the task of evoking
the "unthought-of element in his [Husserl's) works which is wholly
his and yet opens out on something else.• 18 Merleau-Ponty
identifies this unthought-of element with those aspects of our
experienee which are not graspable through the constituting activity
of intentional eonsciousness. Regarding this cO'nstituting activity,
Merleau-Ponty asserts that: ·Originallya project·to gain intellectual
possession of the world, constitution becomes increasingly, as
Husserl's thought matures, the means of unveiling a back side of
things that we have not constituted.• 17 This un'thought-of
element refers to the indeterminate aspect(s) of experience which
eannot be made determinate; it is the "experience-fringe" which
forms the horizon for each of our perceptions. Merleau-Ponty
implies, moreover, that it is unthought-of in at least two different
senses: it is unthought-of insofar as it does not get developed in
Husserl's own work, and it is unthought-of insofar as it is incspsble
of being constituted by thought.
In Merleau-Ponty's last unfinished work, The Visible snd the
Invisible, he takes up·the challenge of thinking the un-thought by
investigating some of these "syntheses which dweil this side of any
thesis.• 18 One of these ·syntheses· is the phenomenon of
reversibility, a corporeal "synthesis" that is continually being played
out in our daily experiences of touching and being touched, and
which is described eloquently by Merleau-Ponty through the
example of one hand touching the other. It is a strange kind of
16 Sig,.., p. 160.
17 Signs, p. 180.
11 Signs, p. 163.
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'SynthesiS, however, because although it is continually enacted it is
never completed. The hand that touches is the hand that is
touched; the two experiences occur" simultaneously but are not
perceived simultaneously. We can feet ourselves touching or being
touched, and can -reverse- our attention from the one experience
to the other, but, just as in the famous ducklrabbit Gestalt, we
cannot experience both at once. Moreover, there is.no thesis here
insofar as this -synthesis- unfolds, for the most part, pre-
reflectively; it occurs independently of the constituting activity of
consciousness and even when we attempt to grasp it reflectively,
it escapes further ~nalysis.
In one of his final, untitled Working Notes, Merleau-Ponty
makes a schematic reference to Husserl's desire to analyze that
which resists analysis through -disentangling- or ·unraveling- what
is entangled, and he notes that -the idea of chiasm and Ineinander
is on the contrary the idea that every analysis that disentsnlJles
renders unintelligible. -19 Reversibility cannot be -disentangled·
because it involves a chiasmic intertwining of the flesh in which the
touching and touched are indeed -Ineinander. - It is because I touch
that I can be touched, and if I am not touched, then I will not be
able to touch; neither experience is reducible to the other, and yet
each makes the other possible.
The duality of touching and being touched is a paradigm for
Merleau-Ponty's discussion of reversibility, but the corporeal
phenomenon of reversibility also characterizes temporality itself,
giving the latter a bodily dimension insofar as ·past and present are
Ineinander, each enveloping-enveloped-and that itself' is the
flesh. -20 To say that the chiasmic relationship between past and
present is the flesh suggests that time and being must be
understood together, not apart from one another. And, to deepen
our understanding of this relationship in a manner that will avoid
disentangling that which is entangled, Merleau-Ponty teils us that
we will need -a new kind of intelligibility (intelligibility through th
world and Being as they are 'vertical' and not horizonts!).-
19 VI, p. 268, November 1960.
20 "Time .00 Chialm: Nov. 1960, VI, p. 268.
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What is this new type of intelligibility that Merleau-Ponty
was seeking towards the end of his life? It is an intelligibility that
does not seek a wider and wider sphere of determinacy, that does
not progress along a linear temporal path, but rather, one which
descends into the depths of the phenomena, in a vertical dimension
that has no absolute WtopW or WbottomWbut which allows movement
in both directions at once. And perhaps through this
descending/ascending, reversible movement, .we will be able to
uncover that Wfungierende or latent intentionality· which Husserl
only begins to reveal, Wthe intentionality within being. w21
Conclulion
At the conclusion of the wPhilosopher and his Shadow,W
Merleau-Ponty states that: WWilly-nilly, against his plans and
according to his essential audacity, Husserl awakens a wild-
flowering world and mind. w22 Merleau-Ponty, Camus and de
Beauvoir are only three of the· many philosophers who have
responded to its call. What is so distinctive about their own
responses to Husserl's legacy is that they have managed to open.up
this wild-flowering world and mind which defies straightforward
analysis to our gaze, our touch, our activity, and our participation.
Each of them seeks meaning within this chaotic turbulence without
destroying or denying the fundamental indeterminacy which is its
·subsoil.· And yet, the meaning they fJnd and explore is not the
same; the notions of ambiguity, absurdity, and reversibility cannot
be reduced to one another as different names for the phenomenon
of indeterminacy.
Oe Beauvoir's discussion of the ethics of ambiguity focuses
on the non-categorical imperatives that compel us to define
ourselves through our actions; actions which continually address but
cannot resolve an essentially ambiguous situation. Camus searches
for happiness through an absurdly defiant affirmation of the
insurmountable barriers that are ranged all around human lucidity,
an affirmation that can and must say ·yes· to life. Finally, Merleau-
21 Wortilll Note, VI, p. 244, April 1960.
Z2 Signs, pp. 180-181.
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Ponty explores the reversible interplay between the visible and the
invisible dimensions of the flesh, an ongoing dynamic that uncovers
new realms of indeterminacy and, therefore, new possibilitie8 for
phenomenological investigation.
The different directions taken by de Beauvoir, Camus, and
Merleau-Ponty indicate how rich indeed is the subsoil of this wild-
flowering region, and, in so doing, they show us that the
indeterminacy of the horizon is not at the ·fringes· of experience,
but at its center.
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